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Secure Context-sensitive Authorization
Kazuhiro Minami and David Kotz
Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH, USA 03755
{minami, dfk}@cs.dartmouth.edu

Abstract
There is a recent trend toward rule-based authorization systems to achieve flexible security policies. Also, new sensing technologies in pervasive computing make it possible to define context-sensitive rules, such as “allow database
access only to staff who are currently located in the main office.” However, these rules, or the facts that are needed
to verify authority, often involve sensitive context information. This paper presents a secure context-sensitive authorization system that protects confidential information in facts or rules. Furthermore, our system allows multiple hosts
in a distributed environment to perform the evaluation of an authorization query in a collaborative way; we do not
need a universally trusted central host that maintains all the context information. The core of our approach is to
decompose a proof for making an authorization decision into a set of sub-proofs produced on multiple different hosts,
while preserving the integrity and confidentiality policies of the mutually untrusted principals operating these hosts.
We prove the correctness of our algorithm.
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Introduction

Pervasive computing leads to an increased integration between the real world and the computational world. Many
such applications adapt to the user’s context, that is, the user’s situation and environment. We consider a class of
applications that wish to consider a user’s context when deciding whether to authorize a user’s access to important
physical or information resources. Such a context-sensitive authorization scheme is necessary when a mobile user
moves across multiple administrative domains where they are not registered in advance. Also, users interacting with
their environment need a non-intrusive way to access resources, and clues about their context may be useful input into
authorization policies for these resources.
There are several rule-based authorization systems [3, 4, 9, 18] that allow a resource owner or a manager to define
authorization rules that refer to the context of the requester. These existing context-sensitive authorization systems
have a central server that collects context information, and evaluates policies to make authorization decisions on
behalf of a resource owner. A centralized solution assumes that all resource owners trust the server to make correct
decisions, and all users trust the server not to disclose private context information. In many realistic applications
of pervasive computing, however, the resources, users, and sources of context information are inherently distributed
among many organizations that do not necessarily trust each other. Resource owners may not trust the integrity of
context information produced by another domain, and context sensors may not trust others with the confidentiality
of data they provide about users. An authorization rule that refers to user location, for example, may raise concerns
about location privacy [5, 10, 11, 18], because the information might allow others to infer their activities (e.g., a
secret business meeting). A policy that depends on the medical condition of patients must respect HIPAA rules about
the confidentiality of medical records [1]. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work addresses the issue of
information confidentiality in authorization rules.
This paper is a near-final pre-publication version of an article that will appear in the journal “Pervasive and Mobile Computing (PMC)”
published by Elsevier. The final published version as it appears in the journal (PDF and HTML) will be available only on an Elsevier site. A much
shorter version of the paper will appear at PerCom, March 8–12, 2005.

1

Query
Query

Sub−proof
tree

Sub−query

Host A
Sub−query

Proof tree
Sub−proof
tree
Host A

Host B

Sub−proof
tree
Host C

(a) Centralized authorization server

(b) Decentralized multiple authorization servers

Figure 1. Decentralized evaluation of an authorization query. The proof of a query is decomposed into sub-proofs and produced on distributed multiple hosts. On the left, Host A
generates a whole proof on a centralized server. On the right, Host A, B, and C produce only a
subtree of the proof.

We propose a secure, distributed, context-sensitive rule-based authorization system. When a client requests access
to a resource, the resource owner constructs a logical statement (query) that, if proven TRUE, indicates that access
may be granted; otherwise access is denied. Although the resource’s host has a knowledge base containing rules
that represent authorization policies and facts about the users, it may not have all of the necessary information and
thus collaborates with other hosts to attempt to construct a proof for the query. Thus, rather than depending on a
central trusted server (Figure 1a), we decompose a proof into sub-proofs produced by multiple hosts (Figure 1b).
This collaboration is only possible if the querier can trust the integrity of other hosts (to provide correct facts and to
properly evaluate rules) and if the other hosts can trust the querier with confidential facts. We assume that these trust
relationships are defined by principals, each of which represents a specific user or organization, and that each host is
associated with one principal (e.g., the owner of a PDA, or the manager of a server).
Our approach provides several benefits:
Confidentiality: Information used for making an authorization decision is protected according to access-control policies defined by the owner of that information.
Integrity: Proofs are evaluated by principals (hosts) that are trusted by the queriers.
Scalability: By distributing the knowledge base and proof construction we off-load work from a resource that may
have limited processing or communication capability.
In the following sections, we introduce our authorization rule language and how this language can define integrity
and confidentiality policies. Section 4 describes our authorization system for the simpler case, where policies apply
only to facts. We describe the architecture of our system and introduce the concept of distributed processing for an
authorization query. We next describe our enforcement mechanism for confidentiality policies and give some key
algorithms for handling queries in a distributed way. We give an example application at the end of the section. In
Section 5, we describe the general case that supports policies on rules as well, following the structure of the preceding
section. We describe the representation of a proof and the algorithm that can verify the integrity of the proof. Section 6
proves that our algorithm ensures the integrity and confidentiality policies of the principals constructing an arbitrary
proof tree. We discuss related work in Section 7. Section 8 covers some design issues and security properties in our
system, and Section 9 concludes.
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Background

In this section, we describe our language for defining authorization policies and introduce the concept of a proof
tree, which is constructed when evaluating an authorization query.

2.1

Authorization rule language

In rule-based authorization systems, authorization policies are represented as logical expressions. We express
access-control policies with Horn clauses since they are expressive enough to support the rules in existing rule-based
authorization systems [3, 4, 9]. We do not use a general first-order logic, which is not decidable in general. The syntax
of a Horn clause is b ← a1 ∧ a2 . . . ∧ an , which says that simple statements called atoms a1 through an , if all true,
imply b. The atom b is called the head of the clause, and the atoms a1 , . . . , an the body of the clause. An atom is
usually used to state a fact. An atom is formed from a predicate symbol followed by a parenthesized list of variables
and constants. We can express the fact “Bob is in Hanover” as location(Bob, Hanover), for example.
Example authorization rules. The teams responding to a large-scale disaster are coordinated by experts drawn
from multiple disciplines (fire, police, medical) and often multiple jurisdictions (city, state, federal). Increasingly, incident commanders use software to assist with incident management and situational awareness. The National Incident
Management System [13] defines clear roles for the many participants in a large-scale response, so role-based access
control (RBAC) [19] is a natural basis for protecting resources in an incident management system (IMS). Such an IMS
needs to dynamically link people, resources, and information from multiple domains, providing information to those
who need it in a time of crisis.
Suppose that an incident occurs in an airport. There is a surveillance camera image server managed by the airport,
and the chief of operations (bob) wishes to use the camera images to improve his awareness of the situation. Figure 2
shows a set of rules that define the airport’s policy to grant access to the camera resource, which allows the local police
chief access to the images whenever he is in the airport, as determined by either his Wi-Fi network connection or by
the GPS tracking device in his radio. Rule 1 says that principal P must hold the role operation chief to be granted,
and rule 2 defines the two conditions to hold that role. The first condition specifies the prerequisite role police chief
in a police department, and the second requires principal P to be in the airport. Rules 3–5 specify how we derive the
location of principal P from the raw location information of a device.

2.2

Proof tree

To make an authorization decision, we must check whether a proof tree for query ?grant(P ) can be constructed
with a given set of rules and facts. The proof tree consists of nodes that represent rules (or facts) and edges that
represent the unification that replaces an atom in the body of a rule in a parent node with the atoms in the body of a
rule or a fact in a child node. Every leaf node contains a fact that has no atom in its body.
Given the facts listed in Figure 2, we can construct the proof tree shown in Figure 3 by unifying the query with the
first four rules, substituting variables as needed. We return to this example in Sections 4.6 and 5.6 to explain how we
construct this proof in a distributed fashion.

3

Security policies

Each principal defines confidentiality policies to protect information in its knowledge base. It also defines integrity
policies to specify whether it believes that evaluation results or rules received from other principals are correct.

3.1

Rule patterns

We first introduce the notion of rule patterns, which are mechanisms for expressing these security policies in
our security model. A rule pattern is just a regular Horn clause to be unified with a rule or a fact in the knowledge base. We use a rule pattern to specify to which rules and facts a given policy is applied, because it is
infeasible to specify a policy on each instance of a rule or a fact. A rule pattern is associated with a set of
rules or facts that match it through unification, a pattern-matching process that makes a rule pattern and an actual
3

Rules:
grant(P )
role(P, operation chief)
location(P, L)
location(D, L)
location(D, L)

←
←
←
←
←

role(P, operation chief)
roleIn(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)
owner(P, D) ∧ location(D, L)
wif i(D, A) ∧ in(A, L)
gps(D, X, Y ) ∧ closeT o(X, Y, L)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Facts:
roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept).
owner(bob, pda15)
wif i(pda15, ap39).
in(ap39, airport).

Bob is chief of the local police department.
Bob owns device pda15
pda15 is associated with access point ap39.
Access point ap39 is at the airport.

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Figure 2. Sample set of rules. We use uppercase for variables and lowercase for constants
and names.

?grant(bob)

grant(bob) ← role(bob, operation chief)

role(bob, operation chief) ← roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(bob, airport)

roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)

location(bob, airport) ← owner(bob, pda15) ∧ location(pda15, airport)

replacements

owner(bob, pda15)

location(pda15, airport) ← wif i(pda15, ap39) ∧ in(ap39, airport)

eT o(X, Y, L)
wif i(pda15, ap39)

Figure 3. Example proof tree based on the rules in Figure 2.

4

in(ap39, airport)

rule in the knowledge base identical by instantiating variables in the rule pattern. For example, the rule pattern
location(bob, X) is matched with the fact location(bob, hanover) in the knowledge base, because the variable X
can be instantiated to hanover. It does not match with the fact location(alice, hanover), however. The rule pattern
role(X, Y ) ← occupation(X, Y ) ∧ location(X, hospital) can be matched with the rule role(P, physician) ←
occupation(P, physician) ∧ location(P, hospital) by instantiating X to P and Y to physician.
A principal may define as many security policies as it sees fit to define. Each security policy (rp, t) is represented
as a rule pattern rp and a set of trusted principals t.

3.2

Integrity policies

Integrity policies express trust in the correctness of rules and facts. Our definition is based on the information flow
theory [6] whose focus is confidence on the accuracy of information rather than alternation of information. When
a principal pi defines the integrity policy (rp, t) it means that pi trusts those principals in t, which we often denote
trusti (rp), to be correct in whatever rules or facts match pattern rp. We use subscript i in the trust policy to denote
which principal defines the policy.
The integrity of a fact means that the boolean value representing a fact is correct. For example, if principal p0
includes principal p1 in its trust0 (loc(P, X)), then principal p0 believes that p1 ’s evaluation (true or false) of a location
query of the form ?loc(P, X) (e.g., ?loc(bob, hanover)) is correct. On the other hand, the integrity of a rule means
that the rule itself is able to correctly derive a new fact. For example, if principal p0 includes principal p1 in its rule
pattern trust0 (loc(P, X) ← W iF i(P, Y )∧in(Y, X)), then p0 believes that p1 ’s rule loc(bob, X) ← W iF i(bob, Y )∧
in(Y, X) is a correct rule to resolve the query of the form ?loc(bob, hanover). In other words, principal p0 believes
that the query loc(bob, hanover) is replaced with two sub-queries ?W iF i(bob, Y ) and ?in(Y, hanover). Principal p0
can verify that principal p1 applied the rule correctly to derive the conclusion by checking the proof as we describe in
Section 5.1.
Notice that trust on a fact is a stronger notion than trust on a rule. Trust on a fact implicitly trusts the rules used to
derive that fact. For example, the trust on the rule pattern loc(X, Y ) implicitly indicates trust of any rule whose head
can be unified with loc(X, Y ).

3.3

Confidentiality policies

Confidentiality policies protect facts and rules in a principal’s knowledge base. A fact must be protected if it
contains confidential information. A rule must be protected if confidential information may be inferred from reading
the rule. For example, the rule grant(P ) ← loc(bob, sudikoff ) says that any principal P is granted access when bob
is at the location of sudikoff building. If a request is granted, the requester may infer that bob is at Sudikoff, which
might not be public knowledge.
When a principal pi defines the confidentiality policy (rp, t), it means that pi trusts those principals in t, which we
often refer to as the access control list acli (rp), with facts or rules matching rule pattern rp. Principal p0 only responds
to a query q from principal p1 if there exists a rule pattern rp that can be unified with the query q and principal p1
belongs to acl0 (rp). For example, suppose that principal p0 defines the policy acl0 (location(bob, L)) = {p1 , p2 };
principal p0 responds to a query ?location(bob, hanover) from principal p1 , because rule pattern location(bob, L)
matches with location(bob, hanover).

3.4

Assumptions

In this paper we make a few assumptions to maintain our focus on the confidentiality and integrity issues in distributed context-sensitive authorization systems. First, the integrity and confidentiality policies of each principal are
public knowledge. Second, a public-key infrastructure is available and every principal can obtain the public key of
other participants, so that they can establish secure channels with a session key and verify the authenticity of messages
with digital signatures. Third, we assume that there is a directory service that knows which principal handles what
types of queries.
For purposes of simplifying our explanation, we consider the basic case that supports security policies only on facts
first in Section 4, and then the general case that supports security policies on facts and rules in Section 5.

5

Host

Logical
Query
User

Request

Service

Authorization
Query

Host

Host

Host

Host
Host
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Authorization for the basic case
In this section, we describe our authorization system for the basic case that supports security policies only on facts.

4.1

Architecture

With no central server to make authorization decisions, we use multiple hosts that are administered by different
principals. Without loss of generality, we assume that each host i is administered by a different principal pi , although
in many realistic environments there may be principals that own or manage many hosts. Each host stores a local
copy of its principal’s integrity and confidentiality policies. Each host provides an interface for handling queries from
remote hosts, and may ask other hosts to resolve any subqueries necessary. In Figure 4, a user sends a request to the
server that provides some service, and the server issues an authorization query to a host it chooses in order to make a
granting decision.
The structure of a host is shown in Figure 5. The query handler handles queries from other hosts and enforces the
local confidentiality policies. The inference engine constructs a proof tree for a given query based on the rules and facts
in the local knowledge base. If some query cannot be evaluated locally, the inference engine issues a remote query to
another host through the query issuer. The query issuer refers to its local integrity policies to choose a principal whose
evaluation of the query is trusted; the integrity policies serve as a directory service to choose a principal to which it
sends a query. The query issuer receives a response and checks its integrity based on the integrity policies. The event
handler converts events that contain new context information into corresponding facts and updates the knowledge base;
these events may be delivered by a context-dissemination service such as Solar [7].

4.2

Proof object

The response to a query is a proof object represented as (pr , n, (value)Kr ), where pr is a receiver principal. The
proof object contains a nonce n that is attached with the query to prevent replay attacks by an adversary that is capable
of intercepting the encrypted messages between principals. We omit the field of a nonce n in the proof object for
brevity in the following discussion. The value is a query result, which is a boolean value (TRUE or FALSE), a
conjunction of boolean values, or the value REJECT. The value REJECT is used when a given query is not handled
because the querier principal does not satisfy the handler principal’s confidentiality policies. Otherwise, the handler
principal constructs a proof tree locally, then includes the query’s result (TRUE or FALSE) in the proof object. (We
name the returned object a proof object because, in the general case in Section 5, it contains a proof tree that shows
how the query result is derived.) The receiver principal pr might not be the principal that issues query q (we explain
6
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Figure 5. Structure of a host.
why, below), and, therefore, the name of the receiver principal needs to be included in the proof object, so that the
receiver principal can decrypt an encrypted value. The value must be encrypted with receiver principal pr ’s public key
Kr to enforce the confidentiality policies of the publisher principal. The public key encryption is performed to prevent
intermediate principals from reading the value. Furthermore, the whole proof object is transmitted via a secure channel
established with a session key between a querier and a handler principal to prevent an eavesdropper from reading the
content of the proof object. The digital signature of a proof signed by a handler principal ensures nonreputability of
the handler; that is, the handler principal is not able to falsely deny later that it sent the proof.
A principal p0 that handles query q0 might issue subqueries to other principals, and the returned proofs from those
principals might contain encrypted query results that principal p0 cannot decrypt. Therefore, the query q0 ’s result
depends on the encrypted values in the proofs for the subqueries that p0 issues, and principal p0 returns a proof for
query q0 that contains the query results for the subqueries as follows. Suppose that principal p0 issues subqueries qi
for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, and receives several pfi = (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) ) where pr(i) is the receiver principal of the proof,
valuei is the query qi ’s result, and Kr(i) is principal pr(i) ’s public key. The query q0 ’s result is TRUE only if p0 can
verify that valuei is TRUE for all i in the proof. If any pfr(i) (for which r(i) = 0) is FALSE, p0 returns a simple proof
(pr , (FALSE)Kr ). Otherwise, if there are some subproofs that p0 cannot decrypt (because r(i) 6= 0), then principal p0
returns the proof (pr , (Πi (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) ))Kr ) for all r(i) 6= 0, as a response to query q0 . The proof contains the
concatenated subproofs encrypted with public key Kr . The query result of the proof is TRUE if the conjunction of all
the valuei (i.e., ∧i (valuei )) is TRUE.

4.3

Decomposition of a proof tree

When a querier issues a query to a principal that the querier trusts with the integrity of evaluating the query, the
principal that handles the query only returns a proof that contains the query’s result (TRUE, FALSE, or REJECT),
and the proof tree that derives the query’s result does not have to be disclosed to the querier. If multiple principals
are involved in processing a query, no single principal obtains all the rules and facts in the proof tree of the original
query. Instead, the proof tree for the query is decomposed into multiple subtrees evaluated by different principals in
a distributed environment. In other words, there is no single principal that maintains a whole proof; instead, each
principal maintains a subproof of the whole proof.
Figure 6 shows that the proof tree for query q0 is constructed by principal p0 , p1 , and p2 in a distributed way.
Principal p0 receives query q0 and issues subquery q1 to principal p1 to construct a proof tree T0 , and principal p1
similarly issues query q2 to principal p2 to construct a proof tree T1 . The facts or rules in the proof trees T0 , T1 , and
T2 are not disclosed to other principals; the result of evaluating each proof tree is returned to the querier as a boolean
value or conjunction of encrypted boolean values.
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Query q0
Principal p0

Proof tree T0
Node n0

q1
p1

PSfrag replacements

Proof tree T1
n1

q2
p2

Proof tree T2

Figure 6. Decomposed proof tree. Principals p0 ,p1 ,and p2 construct a proof tree for query q0
in a distributed way. Nodes n0 and n1 are leaf nodes of proof trees T0 and T1 respectively.
Principal p0 that handles query q0 issues query q1 to principal p1 to obtain the fact in node n0 ,
and principal p1 similarly issues query q2 to principal p2 .

Example. Figure 7 shows the proofs in the evaluation of the query ?grant(bob), involving p1 , p2 and p3 .
The query ?grant(bob) from principal p0 to p1 is decomposed into two sub-queries ?role(bob, doctor) and
?location(bob, hospital) according to the rule rule1 ≡ grant(X) ← role(X, doctor) ∧ location(X, hospital), and
those subqueries are handled by principal p2 and p3 respectively. Principal p2 has the matching fact role(bob, doctor)
in its knowledge base and returns the proof (p1 , T RU E) to principal p1 . Principal p3 also returns the proof
(p1 , T RU E). Principal p1 trusts the integrity of the proofs from p2 and p3 according to its integrity policies, and
internally constructs the proof tree that contains the rule rule1 as a root node and the facts role(bob, doctor) and
location(bob, hospital) as its children nodes. Principal p1 concludes that the statement grant(bob) is true and returns
the proof (p0 , T RU E).

4.4

Enforcement of confidentiality policies

The enforcement of each principal’s confidentiality policies is different from that in many existing authorization
systems, which check the privileges of a requester principal before divulging information directly to the requester. In
our system, a principal that publishes a proof chooses the receiver of the proof from a list of upstream principals in the
whole proof tree. The principal may make that choice because its confidentiality policy does not allow it to divulge the
information to the querier, but may allow the information to be released to another principal further up the tree. The
encrypted result will become part of the querier’s response up the tree; eventually the receiver principal may decrypt
the result and compute the conjunction to see whether the tree is true.
We formally define the ordered list of upstream principals as follows. We say that a principal represents a proof-tree
node when a rule or a fact contained in that node is published by that principal. We denote the principal that represents
node n as rep(n), and the ordered list of principals that represent a corresponding ordered list of nodes s as rep(s).
Suppose that principal p represents a node n in a proof tree. We denote the ordered list of nodes on the path from the
root of the proof tree to n, excluding n, as upstream nodes(n). That is, the nodes are ordered from the root node
downward.
The list of upstream principals for p is defined as rep(upstream nodes(n)), which we denote as receivers(p). In
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Security policies

p0

(p0 , T RU E)

trust(grant(P )) = {p1 }

?grant(bob)

Knowledge base / Security policies

PSfrag replacements

p1
(p1 , T RU E)
?role(bob, doctor)

rule1
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 }
trust(location(P, L)) = {p3 }
(p1 , T RU E)
?location(bob, hospital)

p3

p2
Knowledge base

Knowledge base
location(bob, hospital)

role(bob, doctor)

rule1 ≡ grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)

Figure 7. Example of distributed query processing. The solid arrows are labeled with queries
and the dashed arrows are labeled with returned proofs. The rounded rectangles with dotted
lines represent the knowledge bases and security policies of those principals respectively. The
definition of rule1 is enclosed in the rectangle at the bottom of the figure.
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q2
p3
pf3 ≡ (p0 , (value3 )K0 )
q0
p0

q1
p1

pf1 ≡ (p0 , ((pf3 ))K0 )

p2
pf2 ≡ (p1 , ((pf3 )(pf4 ))K1 )
q3
p4
pf4 ≡ (p1 , (value4 )K1 )

Figure 8. Enforcement of confidentiality policies. Principal p0 ’s query q0 is handled by principals
p1 , p2 , p3 , and p4 in a distributed way. Principal pi handles query qi−1 , and returns the proof pfi ,
for i = 1 to 4.

Figure 8, principal p0 ’s issuing query q0 causes principals p1 and p2 to issue subqueries q1 , q2 and q3 . Principal p3 ’s
list receivers(p3 ) is < p0 , p1 , p2 >, for example.
When a publisher principal chooses a receiver from the list receivers(p), the receiver must satisfy the following
two conditions. First, it must satisfy the publisher’s confidentiality policies. For example, suppose that principal p4
chooses p1 as the receiver of query q3 ’s result. Principal p1 must satisfy p4 ’s confidentiality policies for query q3 ; that
is, p4 must have confidentiality policy (rp, t) where rule pattern rp matches query q3 and principal p1 belongs to a set
of principals t.
Second, the receiver principal must satisfy the constraints due to recursive encryption of a proof at each principal. A principal that handles a query might issue subqueries to other principals. If that principal cannot decrypt the
query results in those subproofs, it includes the subproofs into its proof and encrypts them with the public key of a
receiver principal. This recursive encryption is necessary to prevent a untrusted intermediate principal on the path
towards the receiver from knowing the query result by decrypting some subproof whose query result is FALSE. Because such embedded encrypted subproofs are encrypted recursively by intermediate principals until they reach their
receiving principals, the intermediate principals have to make sure that their encryption on embedded subproofs are
decrypted when the proof reaches the receiving principals of the subproofs. Otherwise, the embedded subproofs pass
the receiving principals without being decrypted, and the proof fails.
In Figure 8, principal p3 chooses p0 as the receiver of proof pf3 ≡ (p0 , (value3 )K0 ) where value3 is query q2 ’s
result and K0 is p0 ’s public key, and p4 chooses p1 as the receiver of proof pf4 . Principal p2 embeds those proofs
from p3 and p4 into proof pf2 , because p2 cannot decrypt those proofs. Suppose that both principal p0 and p1 in
receivers(p2 ) satisfy the first condition; they satisfy p2 ’s confidentiality policies for query q1 . Principal p2 must
choose p1 as the receiver to satisfy the second condition. Because principal p1 decrypts and evaluates the proof pf4 ,
p1 only embeds pf3 into proof pf1 , which is decrypted by principal p0 , if the evaluation of pf4 is TRUE. (Otherwise, p2
drops the proof pf3 and return a proof that contains a FALSE value.) If principal p2 chooses p0 as the receiver of proof
pf2 instead, the proof pf4 , which is embedded in proof pf2 , is forwarded to p0 without being decrypted by p1 and the
proof is not usable by p0 .
In general, a proof contains any number of encrypted subproofs. Suppose that principal pi ’s list receivers(pi ) is
< p0 , . . . , pi−1 >, and pi returns proof pfi that contains subproofs pfj for j = 0, . . . , n − 1 to principal pk . Let pr(j)
be the receiver principal for proof pfj , and index(p, s) be the function that returns p’s index in the ordered list s. The
second condition for selecting a receiver is stated as follows.
∀j ((index(pr(j) , receivers(pi )) ≤ index(pk , receivers(pi ))) ∨ (r(j) = i))
If there is more than one principal that satisfies the above two conditions, principal pk chooses the principal of the
minimum index (closest to the root). This guideline is important not to narrow the choices of the receivers made
by the upstream principals. Note that the proof fails if the path to the root does not permit these decryptions and
validations; the failure results because the integrity and confidentiality policies of the principals involved will not
allow the necessary information sharing. We, therefore, anticipate that an addition of rules or policies by principals
would increase the false negative rate of authorization decisions.
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Figure 9. Query interface.

4.5

Algorithms

Each host (run by some principal) provides an interface HANDLE R EMOTE Q UERY for handling a query from a
remote host. It takes as parameters a query string q, a list of upstream principals receivers defined in Section 4.4, and
a querier principal’s integrity policies i policies, as shown in Figure 9. The function HANDLE R EMOTE Q UERY calls
the function GENERATE P ROOF to obtain a proof.
Figure 10 shows the algorithm for the function GENERATE P ROOF, run on principal p1 ’s host to build a proof while
enforcing confidentiality policies of the handler principal. The algorithm handles the simpler case that a proof from
a remote principal contains a query result (not concatenated subproofs). We describe how to handle concatenated
subproofs in Section 5.5. The function takes several parameters: principal p0 that issues a query, principal p1 that
handles a query, a query string q, a list of upstream principals receivers for p1 (i.e., receivers(p1 )), p0 ’s integrity
policies i policies0 , p1 ’s integrity policies i policies1 , p1 ’s confidentiality policies c policies1 , and p1 ’s knowledge
base KB1 . If p0 is an initial querier, it includes itself into the list receivers.
Lines 2–3 check whether there is any principal in the list receivers that satisfies the handler principal p1 ’s confidentiality policies. The principals that belong to the intersection of receivers and the union of the access-control lists
in p1 ’s confidentiality policies for query q are eligible to receive a proof from p1 . We treat the ordered list receivers
as a set in line 2, and denote the result set as s. If there is no such principal (i.e., the set s is empty), line 4 returns a
proof with a REJECT value to querier principal p0 .
Line 5 sets the receiver principal of a proof in the case that the query result in the proof is obtained locally. The
chosen receiver is the principal that belongs to list s and has the minimum index in the ordered list receivers. We
choose that principal with minIndex(s, receivers) in line 5.
Line 7 checks whether the handler principal p1 satisfies the querier p0 ’s integrity policies (we use the symbol ‘|’ to
denote “such as” in our algorithm for brevity). If not, line 8 returns a proof with a FALSE value to principal pr . Line 9
checks whether query q matches fact f in p1 ’s knowledge base. If so, line 10 returns a proof with a TRUE value to
principal pr .
Lines 11–19 cover the case that query q matches the head of rule r in p1 ’s knowledge base. Line 12 unifies query q
and rule r ≡ A ← B1 , . . . , Bn , resulting in the instantiated rule A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bn0 . Lines 13–14 obtain subproofs for
the subqueries B10 , . . . , Bn0 iteratively. If principal p1 can decrypt all the values in the subproofs, and all the subproofs
contain a TRUE value, then line 16 returns a proof with a TRUE value to principal pr . Line 17 checks whether the
subproofs decrypted by p0 contain a TRUE value, and if so, line 18 checks whether there is some principal pr0 that
satisfies the constraint due to the recursive encryption we describe in Section 4.4; that is, pr0 ’s index in the ordered list
receivers must be greater than or equal to the index of pr(i) in receivers if r(i) 6= 1. If there is such a principal pr0 ,
line 19 returns a proof containing the subproofs whose values could not be decrypted by p1 with principal pr0 as the
recipient.
When lines 7–19 fail to construct a proof that derives query q, our algorithm does not return a proof that contains
FALSE immediately. Instead, it tries to obtain a proof from a remote principal in lines 21–25. Line 21 checks whether
there is any principal pl that satisfies p1 ’s integrity policies for query q. If that holds true, line 22 appends p1 into the
ordered list receivers, and line 23 calls the function ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY. Line 24 returns the returned proof. If
line 21 fails to find such a principal pl , then line 25 returns a proof with a FALSE value.
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GENERATE P ROOF (p0 , p1 , q, receivers, i

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

policies0 , i policies1 , c policies1 , KB1 )

 Check whether there
S is any principal in receivers that satisfies p1 ’s confidentiality policies.
s ← receivers ∩ ( i ti ) for all policies (rpi , ti ) ∈ c policies1 where rpi matches q
if s = ∅  if set s is empty.
then return (p0 , (REJECT)K0 )
pr ← minIndex(s, receivers)
 Check whether principal p1 satisfies querier p0 ’s integrity policies.
if ¬(∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policies0 ) ∧ (rp matches q) ∧ (p1 ∈ t)))
then return (pr , (FALSE)Kr )
if ∃ fact f | ((f ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (f matches q))
then return (pr , (TRUE)Kr )
elseif ∃ rule r ≡ A ← B1 , . . . , Bn | ((r ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (A matches q))
then unify q and A ← B1 , . . . , Bn , resulting in A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bn0
for i ← 1 to n
do pfi ← GENERATE P ROOF(p1 , p1 , Bi0 , receivers, i policies1 , i policies1 , c policies1 , KB1 )
where pfi = (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) ), and r(i) is a receiver principal of pfi
if ∀i ((pfi = (p1 , (valuei )K1 )) ∧ (valuei = TRUE))
then return (pr , (TRUE)Kr )
elseif ∀i ((pfi = (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) )) ∧ (((r(i) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (valuei = TRUE))))
then if ∃ pr0 | (∀i (((pr0 ∈ s) ∧ (index(pr(i) , receivers) ≤ index(pr0 , receivers)) ∧ (r(i) 6= 1))
∨(r(i) = 1)))
then return (pr0 , (Πi pfi )Kr0 )
for all i where pfi = (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) ) ∧ (r(i) 6= 1)
 If we fail to construct a proof that derives the query locally, we try to obtain a proof from a remote principal.
if ∃ principal pl (∃ policy p = (rp, t) ((p ∈ i policies1 ) ∧ (rp matches q) ∧ (pl ∈ t)))
then append p1 to receivers
proof ← ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY(pl , q, receivers, i policies1 )
return proof
else return (pr , (FALSE)Kr )
Figure 10. Algorithm for generating a proof.
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p0

?grant(bob)

p1

grant(P ) ← role(P, operation chief )

p8
?role(bob, operation chief )
(p1 , (p1 , (T RU E)K1 ))

p2

?role(bob, police chief, police dept)

acl(role(P, R)) = {p1 }

?location(bob, airport)

(p2 , (T RU E)K2 )

role(bob, police chief, police dept)
acl(role(P, R, police dept)) = {p1 , p2 }

role(P, operation chief ) ← role(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)

(p1 , (T RU E)K1 )

p3

location(P, L) ← owner(P, D) ∧ location(D, L)
owner(bob, pda15)
acl(location(P, L)) = {p1 }

p4

?owner(bob, pda15)

?location(pda15, L)

(p4 , (T RU E)K4 )

(p4 , (T RU E)K4 )

owner(bob, pda15)
acl(owner(P, D)) = {p4 }

p6

p5

?wif i(pda15, ap39)

location(D, L) ← in(A, L) ∧ wif i(D, A)
in(ap39, airport)
acl(location(D, L)) = {p4 }

(p6 , (T RU E)K6 )

p7

wif i(pda15, ap39)
acl(wif i(D, L)) = {p6 }

Figure 11. Example of an emergency response system. Principal p0 is a first responder whose
role is “operation chief”. Principal p1 represents a surveillance camera image server. Principal
p2 is the role membership server of an incident management system (IMS). Principal p3 is the
role membership server of a police department. Principal p4 represents a location-tracking
service. The arrows represent the flow of queries among the principals. Each arrow is labeled
with a query and a returned proof. The query is shown above the dashed line; the proof is
shown below the line. Each principal’s rules, facts and confidentiality policies are shown in a
dashed rectangle.

4.6

Example application

Consider again our initial example of an incident management system (IMS) shown in Figure 2; a centralized
server would produce the proof tree in Figure 3. Figure 11 shows how user bob (principal p0 ) requests images from
the surveillance camera image server managed by the airport (principal p1 ). Bob’s request is handled by multiple
principals p1 , p2 , . . . , p7 . In Figure 11, every principal issues queries to the principals that satisfy its integrity policies,
and every querier except for principal p2 satisfies the confidentiality policies of the principals to which it sends the
queries. Principal p2 does not satisfy p4 ’s confidentiality policies for query ?location(bob, airport), because p2
is temporarily assigned to manage the role server for the incident, and thus principal p4 does not establish a longterm trust relation with principal p2 . Fortunately, p1 that runs the surveillance camera image server satisfies p4 ’s
confidentiality policies, principal p4 encrypts the query result with p1 ’s public key, and principal p2 embeds p4 ’s proof
into its own proof, then returns it to p1 . Principal p1 decrypts the query result in the proof from p2 , but it is not aware
of the fact that the query result is created by principal p4 .
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5

Authorization for the general case

In this section, we extend our authorization scheme so that it supports security policies on rules as well as on
facts. A proof contains a proof tree that describes the derivation of the query’s result if the evaluation of a query
is true, instead of simply the result TRUE, in order to satisfy a querier principal’s integrity policies. This situation
occurs when the querier principal does not trust the integrity of the query result from the handler principal, but trusts
handler’s rule that is used to decompose the query into subqueries. We describe the integrity of a proof tree, the
representation of the proof that contains a proof tree, and the enforcement mechanisms for confidentiality and integrity
policies respectively.

5.1

Integrity of a proof tree

A principal trusts the integrity of a proof tree (that is, believes its result) for a query if it is consistent with its
integrity policies. We formally define the integrity of a proof tree from the viewpoint of an initial querier principal p0
inductively as follows. Suppose that principal p0 issues a query q to principal p1 .
Base case (single-node tree): If the proof from principal p1 contains a query q’s result, and principal p0 has an integrity policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches query q and p1 belongs to the set of principals t, then p0
trusts the results of the proof tree.
Induction step: If the proof from p1 contains a proof tree whose root node represents a rule r, the head of rule r
matches query q, p0 has an integrity policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches r and p1 belongs to the set
of principals t, and p0 trusts the integrity of the subproof trees under the root node representing r, then p0 trusts
the proof tree.

5.2

Representation of a proof

We represent a proof using nested parentheses based on the grammar in Figure 12. A proof contains five fields: a
sender principal, a receiver principal, a query, a nonce, and a proof tree optionally encrypted for a receiver. The sender
is the principal that publishes a proof, and the receiver is the intended receiver of the proof. The query is a query string
for which the proof is constructed, the nonce is a random number chosen by a querier principal, and the proof tree
represents how the evaluation result for the query is derived.
The hierarchical structure of a proof tree is built by embedding subproofs into a proof recursively. That is, the
proof contains a proof tree that consists of a root node (representing a rule) of the proof tree and the subproofs that
contain the subproof trees under the root node. Therefore, each node in a proof tree described in Section 2.2 has a
corresponding proof (or an embedded subproof) that contains it as the root node of its proof tree. If a proof contains a
single-node proof tree, it only contains a query result or a set of proofs whose query results are encrypted as described
in Section 4.4. The digital signature of a proof is attached with the proof so that a receiver principal can check its
authenticity. It also ensures non-reputability of the sender principal. When a proof tree is a single-node one, the field
for a proof tree contains a query result (value). If a query result depends on encrypted values, it is represented as a set
of value pairs that consist of a receiver principal and an encrypted query result, as we describe in Section 4.2.
The first four fields in a proof are necessary to verify the integrity of its proof tree. The sender’s identity is necessary
to check the authenticity of a proof by checking a digital signature attached with the proof. To verify a proof, one must
verify the integrity of all the embedded subproofs in that proof, which are published by different principals. Therefore,
every principal that publishes the subproof needs to attach a digital signature with it. We omit the digital signature of
a proof from our syntax in Figure 12 for brevity. The receiver’s identity is necessary when a proof tree is encrypted by
the receiver’s public key as we discuss in Section 4.4. The nonce is necessary to prevent a malicious principal from
reusing a proof for an identical query at an earlier time.
When we verify the integrity of the query result in a proof, we check the principal that signs the proof. However,
when we also verify the integrity of a rule in a proof, we check the principal that defines that rule. That principal may
be different from the one that applies the rule to handle a query. Therefore, the rule is paired with the principal that
defines it so that the principal that receives a proof can obtain the digitally signed certificate of that rule separately to
check the integrity of the rule.
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< proof s >
< proof >
< proof tree >
< sender >
< receiver >
< query >
< atom >
< predicate >
< args >
< arg >
< nonce >
< rule cert >
< rule >
< head >
< body >
< signer >
< value pairs >
< value pair >
< value >
< identif ier >
< string >
< character >
< number >
< digit >

::= < proof > (< proof >) ∗
::= ‘(’ < sender >, < receiver >, < query >, < nonce >, < proof tree > ‘)’
::= ‘(’ < rule cert >, ‘(’ < proof s > ‘)’‘)’ | < proof s > | < value pairs > | < value >
::= < identif ier >
::= < identif ier >
::= ? < atom >
::= < predicate > ‘(’ < args > ‘)’
::= < identif ier >
::= < arg > (, < arg >) ∗
::= < identif ier >
::= < number >
::= ‘(’ < rule >, < signer > ‘)’
::= < head > ← < body >
::= < atom >
::= < atom > (∧ < atom >) ∗
::= < identif ier >
::= < value pair > (< value pair >) ∗
::= ‘(’ < receiver >, < value > ‘)’
::= ‘T RU E’ | ‘F ALSE’ | ‘REJECT ’
::= < string >
::= < string >< character > | < character >
::= a| . . . |z|A| . . . |Z|0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9
::= < number >< digit > | < digit >
::= 0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9

Figure 12. Grammar for a proof. A sender principal attaches a digital signature with its
publishing proof, and optionally encrypts the proof tree field of a proof. We, however, omit the
digital signatures and encryptions from our syntax.
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Security policies
trust(grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)) = {p 1 }
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 }
trust(location(P, L)) = {p3 }

p0

Sfrag replacements

?grant(bob)

proof1 ≡ (p1 , p0 , ?grant(bob), (rule1 , (proof2 , proof3 )))

Knowledge base
rule1 ≡ grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)

p1
proof2 ≡ (p2 , p1 , ?role(bob, doctor), T RU E)
?role(bob, doctor)

proof3 ≡ (p3 , p1 , ?location(bob, hospital), T RU E)
?location(bob, hospital)

Knowledge base

Knowledge base

p2

p3

role(bob, doctor)

location(bob, hospital)

Figure 13. Construction of a proof tree. The solid arrows are labeled with queries and the
dashed arrows are labeled with returned proof trees. The rounded rectangles with dotted lines
represent the knowledge bases or security policies of those principals respectively. We omit
nonce and digital signatures in the proofs for brevity.

Example. The example in Figure 13 is a modification of Figure 7. Principal p0 has different integrity policies, and,
as a result, principal p1 returns a proof that contains a proof tree. Principal p0 does not trust the integrity of p1 to
evaluate the query ?grant(bob), but does trust the integrity of rule1 . Principal p1 constructs a proof that consists of
the rule rule1 as a root node and the sub-proofs proof2 and proof3 as leaf nodes and returns it to principal p0 . The
proof tree constructed by principal p1 is trusted by principal p0 because principal p0 trusts rule1 in principal p1 and
the facts role(bob, doctor) and location(bob, hospital) in principals p2 and p3 respectively, according to its integrity
policies.

5.3

Decomposition of proof trees.

In the general case, a response to a query is a proof that contains a proof tree that satisfies the integrity policies of
a querier. If the integrity of the principal that handles a query is trusted by the querier, it only returns a single-node
proof tree that contains a query result. If there are such principals participating in evaluating a query, the whole proof
tree is decomposed into several subtrees and is evaluated by those principals in a distributed way. The facts and rules
used for evaluating a subtree do not have to be disclosed to a querier principal.
In Figure 14, principals p0 , p1 , . . . , p10 are the participants in evaluating a query, and each arrow shows how a proof
tree flows from one principal to another. We show only the fields for a sender and a receiver principals for brevity,
omitting other fields. The dashed lines show which principal’s integrity policies are applied to the principals enclosed
in the lines. Because principal p0 trusts principal p2 and p3 in terms of the integrity of the given queries; it is possible
to evaluate the query at p0 , p2 , and p3 rather than collecting all the rules and facts at p0 . Principals p2 and p3 construct
a proof tree locally based on their own integrity policies, and return only a single-node proof tree that contains a query
result. Therefore, principal p0 does not know how the query results from p2 and p3 are derived.

5.4

Enforcement of confidentiality policies

We apply the same mechanism for enforcing confidentiality policies in Section 4.4. The only difference is that a
receiver principal must be an upstream principal that evaluates a proof subtree. We, therefore, define a set of principals
16

PSfrag replacements

p0
(p1 , p0 , ((p3 , p1 ), (p4 , p1 )))

p0 ’s integrity policies

(p2 , p0 )

p1

p11
p12
p13

(p3 , p0 )

(p4 , p0 )

p7

(p5 , p2 )

p4

p3
(p7 , p3 )

p2

(p6 , p2 , ((p9 , p2 ), (p10 , p2 )))

p5

(p8 , p3 )

p8

p3 ’s integrity policies

p6
(p9 , p2 )

(p10 , p2 )

p9

p10

p2 ’s integrity policies

Figure 14. Example of subproofs. Principals p0 , . . . , p10 are the participants in evaluating a
query. Each arrow shows how a proof tree flows from one principal to another. Each arrow is
labeled with the pair of a sender and a receiver principals in a proof, omitting the other fields of
the proof for brevity. The dashed lines show which principal’s integrity policies are applied to
the principals enclosed in the lines. The principals p0 , p2 , and p3 that represent the root node
of the nested subtrees are enclosed in the thick rectangles.

receivers(p) whose members are eligible to receive principal p’s proof as follows.
Suppose that in a proof tree there is a sequence of nodes n0 , n1 , . . . , nk on the path from the root n0 to node nk in
the proof tree, and principal pi represents node ni and handles query qi−1 from pi−1 for i = 1 to k. Principal pi where
i < k belongs to the set receivers(pk ) if it satisfies either of the following two conditions.
• Principal pi is p0 .
• Principal pl belongs to receivers(pk ), pl has an integrity policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches query
qi−1 and pi belongs to the set of principals t, and there is no other principal pj (where l < j < i), that satisfies
this condition.
Notice that our new definition does not change the definition of receivers(p) in Section 4.4, because every principal
issues a query to a principal that it trusts in terms of the integrity of evaluating the query. That is, if a querier principal
pi−1 in receivers(p) issues query qi−1 to pi , pi belongs to receivers(p) as well because pi satisfies the second
condition above. In other words, all the upstream principals of p belong to the set receivers(p).

5.5

Algorithms

Each host provides the same remote interface for handling a remote query. We describe the extended version of the
function GENERATE P ROOF, and then introduce the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY that checks the integrity of a
proof tree that contains rules as intermediate nodes.
Algorithm for constructing a proof. In Figure 15, we extend the algorithm in Figure 10 to support security policies
on rules. There are a few modifications as follows. First, a proof has additional fields such as a sender principal, a
query string, and a nonce according to the representation of a proof in Section 5.2. We use the parameter name rcvrs
instead of receivers for compactness.
Second, the algorithm handles a proof from a remote principal that contains multiple subproofs. The query result
of the proof is the conjunction of the query results of all the embedded subproofs. The query result is TRUE if all
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the query results of the embedded subproofs have a TRUE value; otherwise, it is FALSE. Lines 15–19 construct a
proof from the proofs pfi for i = 1 to n obtained by calling the function GENERETE P ROOF in line 14. Each proof pfi
contains either a query result or multiple subproofs. Therefore, the query result of the proof is the conjunction of the
query results of proofs pfi for i = 1 to n, and, if proof pfi contains multiple subproofs, its query result is represented
as the conjunction of those embedded subproofs. Line 15 checks whether the handler principal p1 can read all the
query results of proof pfi , and all the query results are a TRUE value. The query result of the proof is TRUE if the
proof contains a TRUE value or all the embedded subproofs contains a TRUE value. If the condition in line 15 holds
true, line 16 returns a proof with a TRUE value. Line 17 handles the case that principal p1 cannot decrypt all the query
results in the proofs pfi for i = 1 to n and all the decrypted query results have a TRUE value. If so, line 19 checks
whether there is a principal pr0 that satisfies the constraint due to recursive encryption. We need to consider all the
receiver principals of the embedded subproofs as well. If there exist such principal pr0 , line 19 returns a proof that
contains the subproofs whose query results cannot be decrypted by principal p1 .
Third, we handle the case that principal p1 is not trusted by p0 in terms of the evaluation of a query, but p1 ’s
rule, which matches the query, is trusted by principal p0 , in lines 21–27. Line 21 checks whether there is a rule
R ≡ A ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn in p1 ’s knowledge base whose head A matches query q and querier principal p0 satisfies
p1 ’s confidentiality policies for rule R. If there is such rule R, line 22 checks whether querier p0 has an integrity
policy p = (rp0 , t0 ) that trusts the integrity of p1 ’s rule R. Line 23 unifies query q and rule R resulting R0 ≡ A0 ←
B10 , . . . , Bn0 . Lines 24–25 obtain the proofs for the atoms B10 , . . . , Bn0 iteratively. Line 26 checks whether there is a
receiver principal pr0 in the set of principals rcvrs that satisfies the constraints due to recursive encryption described
in Section 4.4. If that holds true, we return the proof that contains rule R0 as the root node of the proof tree, and the
proofs for B10 , . . . , Bn0 as the subproofs under the root node. The proof tree must contain the proofs whose proof trees
are decrypted by p1 to satisfy the receiver principal’s integrity policies.
Fourth, when principal p1 tries to construct a proof by issuing a remote query, we need to check whether querier
principal p0 trusts the integrity of the query result from handler principal p1 . Line 30 checks that condition by checking
whether p1 belongs to rcvrs, because line 8 appends p1 to rcvrs if the condition holds. If that holds true, line 32 issues
a remote query with p1 ’s integrity policies i policies1 . That is, p1 ’s integrity policies are applied to the succeeding
queries. Line 32 checks the integrity of the returned proof by calling the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY. The
function returns a pair of a boolean value (true or false) and a simplified proof as we explain below. If the proof
satisfies p1 ’s integrity policies, line 32 returns the proof returned by the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY. If p1
does not belong to rcvrs, line 35 issues a remote query with principal p0 ’s integrity policies; that is, the querier
principal’s integrity policies are applied to the succeeding queries. Line 36 returns the proof returned by the function
without checking its integrity. In other words, only principals trusted by their querier principals in terms of the integrity
of their query results need to enforce their integrity policies on proofs received from remote principals.
Algorithm for checking the integrity of a proof. The function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY in Figure 16 checks
whether a proof satisfies given integrity policies, based on the definition given in Section 5.1. It takes as parameters
principal pc that checks the integrity of the proof, query string q, nonce nc , proof pf, and pc ’s integrity policies
i policiesc . The function also converts the hierarchical proof tree in a proof into a flat one that contains encrypted
query results in the leaf nodes; that is, all the intermediate nodes are removed from the proof tree while checking the
integrity of those nodes.
Line 1 checks whether nonce n in the proof pf is same as the nonce n for the query. If that is not true, line 2
returns false with no proof tree. Line 3 checks whether pc trusts the integrity of principal ps ’s evaluating query
q. If that holds true, line 4 returns true with the proof given as a parameter. Line 5 checks whether principal pc
can decrypt the proof (i.e., principal pr is a receiver principal of the proof pf ) and reads rule R at the root of the
proof tree. Line 6 checks whether rule r signed by principal pd satisfies pc ’s integrity policies. If that holds true,
lines 7–11 check whether all the proofs for the atoms of rule R satisfies pc ’s integrity policies by calling the function
CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY recursively. If all the proofs satisfy the integrity policies, line 11 returns true with the proof
that contains the concatenation of the subproofs that correspond to the leaf nodes of the initial proof tree.
Notice that it is necessary for the principal that checks the integrity of a proof to be able to read all the rules in the
intermediate nodes of the proof tree.
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GENERATE P ROOF (p0 , p1 , q, n, rcvrs, i

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

policies0 , i policies1 , c policies1 , KB1 )

 Check whether
S there is any principal in rcvrs that satisfies p1 ’s confidentiality policies.
s ← rcvrs ∩ ( i ti ) for all policies (rpi , ti ) ∈ c policies1 where rpi matches q
if s = ∅  if set s is empty.
then return (p1 , p0 , q, n, (REJECT)K0 )
pr ← minIndex(s, rcvrs)
 Check whether principal p1 satisfies querier p0 ’s integrity policies.
if ∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policies0 ) ∧ (rp matches q) ∧ (p1 ∈ t))
then append p1 to rcvrs
if ∃ fact f | ((f ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (f matches q))
then return (p1 , pr , q, n, (TRUE)Kr )
elseif ∃ rule r ≡ A ← B1 , . . . , Bn | ((r ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (A matches q))
then unify q and A ← B1 , . . . , Bn , resulting in A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bn0
for i ← 1 to n
do pfi ← GENERATE P ROOF(p1 , p1 , Bi0 , n, rcvrs, i policies1 , i policies1 , c policies1 , KB1 )
where pfi = (ps(i) , pr(i) , Bi0 , n, (pti )Kr(i) ),
s(i) and r(i) are sender and receiver principals of pfi respectively.
if ∀i ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (((pti = valuei ) ∧ (valuei = TRUE))
∨((pti = Πj (pr(i,j) , (valueij )Kr(i,j) )) ∧ ∀j ((r(i, j) = 1) ∧ (valueij = TRUE)))))
then return (p1 , pr , q, n, (TRUE)Kr )
elseif ∀i ((r(i) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (((pti = valuei ) ∧ (valuei = TRUE))
∨ ((pti = Πj (pr(i,j) , (valueij )Kr(i,j) )) ∧ (∀j ((r(i, j) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i, j) = 1) ∧ (valueij = TRUE))))))))
then if ∃ pr0 ((pr0 ∈ s) ∧ (∀i ((r(i) = 1) ∨ (((pti = valuei )
∧(index(pr(i) , rcvrs) ≤ index(pr0 , rcvrs))) ∨ ((pti = Πj (pr(i,j) , (valueij )Kr(i,j) ))
∧(∀j ((r(i, j) = 1) ∨ (index(pr(i,j) , rcvrs) ≤ index(pr0 , rcvrs)))))))))
then return (p1 , pr0 , q, n, ((Πi (pr(i) , pti ))(Πij (pr(i,j) , (ptij )Kr(i,j) )))Kr0 )
where ((pfi = (ps(i) , pr(i) , Bi0 , n, (pti )Kr(i) ) ∧ (r(i) 6= 1))
∨((r(i) = 0) ∧ (pti = Πj (pr(i,j) , (valueij )Kr(i,j) )) ∧ r(i, j) 6= 1))
 Construct a proof with a rule that satisfies principal p0 ’s integrity policies and p1 ’s confidentiality policies.
if (∃ rule R | ((R ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (R ≡ A ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn ) ∧(A matches q)))
∧(∃ policy p | ((p ∈ c policies1 ) ∧ (p = (rp, t)) ∧ rp matches rule R)))
then if ∃ policy p0 = (rp0 , t0 ) | ((p0 ∈ i policies0 ) ∧ (rp0 matches R) ∧ (p1 ∈ t0 ))
then unify q and rule R resulting R0 ≡ A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bn0
for i ← 1 to n
do pfi ← GENERATE P ROOF(p1 , p1 , Bi0 , n, rcvrs, i policies0 , i policies1 , c policies1 , KB1 )
where pfi = (ps(i) , pr(i) , Bi0 , n, (pti )Kr(i) ), and
s(i) and r(i) are sender and receiver principals of pfi
if ∃pr0 ((pr0 ∈ s) ∧ (∀i (index(pr(i) , rcvrs) ≤ index(pr0 , rcvrs))))
then return (p1 , pr0 , q, n, ((R0 , pc ), Πi pfi )Kr0 ) where pc is a signer principal of rule R
 If we fail to construct a proof that derives the query locally, we try to obtain a proof from a remote principal.
if ∃ principal pl that is capable of handling query q
then if p1 ∈ rcvrs
then proof ← ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY(pl , q, rcvrs, i policies1 )
(trusted, proof 0 ) ← CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY(p1 , q, n, proof, i policies1 )
if trusted
then return proof’
else proof ← ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY(pl , q, rcvrs, i policies0 )
return proof
return (p1 , pr , q, n, (FALSE)Kr )
Figure 15. Algorithm for generating a proof.
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CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY (pc , q, nc , pf, i

policiesc )

1 if ¬((pf = (ps , pr , q, n, (pt)Kr )) ∧ (nc = n))
2
then return (false, NULL)
3 if (∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policiesc ) ∧ (rp matches query q) ∧ (ps ∈ t)))
4
then return (true, pf)
5 elseif ((r = c) ∧ (pt = ((R, pd ), (Πni=1 pfi ))
where R is a rule, pd is the signer principal of R, and pfi for i = 1 to n are subproofs.
6
then if ∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policiesc ) ∧ (rp matches rule R) ∧ (pd ∈ t)
∧(principal pc holds a valid digital signature for R signed by pd ))
where R ≡ A ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn
7
then for i ← 1 to n
8
do (trust, pfi0 ) = CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY(pc , Bi , pfi , i policiesc )
9
if ¬trust
10
then return (false, NULL)
11
return (true, (pc , pc , q, n, (Πi pfi0 )Kc ))
12
else return (false, NULL)
13 else return (false, NULL)
Figure 16. Algorithm for checking proof integrity.

5.6

Example application

We revisit the example of an incident management system (IMS); in Figure 11, every querier principal trusts the
integrity of the principal that handles its query in terms of the correctness of the query’s result. This time, we have
some principals that define security policies on rules as well as facts.
Figure 17 shows how user bob (principal p0 ) requests images from the surveillance camera image server
managed by the airport (principal p1 ). Principal p1 agrees with the policy for role operation chief , that is,
role(P, operation chief ) ← role(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ in(P, airport) is correct, and principal p2 that
runs the role-membership server of IMS uses that rule to evaluate a query role(bob, operation chief ). However,
principal p1 does not trust the answer from principal p2 , since p2 is temporarily assigned to manage the role server for
the incident, and thus principal p1 does not establish a long-term trust relation with principal p2 . Fortunately, principal p2 trusts the role-membership server of the police department and the location tracking service run by principals
p3 and p4 respectively, because those are long-running existing services. Principal p2 is thus able to return a proof
tree that contains the proofs from principal p3 and p4 , and principal p1 trusts that proof. The proof tree also satisfies
the confidentiality policies of principals p2 , p3 and p4 . Principal p4 only returns the evaluation result of the query
?location(bob, airport) because it belongs to trust(location(P, L)) = {p4 } defined by principal p1 .

6

Soundness of the algorithm

We show that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the confidentiality and integrity policies of every participating principal are satisfied.1 We give the proof for the general case in Section 5, which covers the basic case in
Section 4 as its special case. We separate the proof into two parts: the proof on confidentiality policies, and the proof
on integrity policies.

6.1

Proof for confidentiality policies

We prove that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the confidentiality policies of every participating principal are satisfied by induction below.
1 The

other way (completeness of the algorithm) does not hold, as we discuss in Section 8.1, and we leave it as our future work.
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lacements

p8

grant(P ) ← role(P, operation chief )
trust(role(P, operation chief ) ← role(P, police chief, police dept)) = {p 2 }

p0

?grant(bob)

p1

trust(role(P, R, police dept)) = {p3 }
trust(location(P, L)) = {p4 }

?role(bob, operation chief )
(p2 , p1 , ?role(bob, operation chief ), (rule1 , ((p3 , p1 , ?roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept), T RU E), (p4 , p1 , ?location(bob, airport), T RU E))

p2

rule1 ≡ role(P, operation chief ) ← roleIn(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)
acl(role(P, R)) = {p1 }

?roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)

?location(bob, airport)

(p3 , p1 , ?role(bob, police chief, police dept), T RU E)

(p4 , p1 , ?location(bob, airport), T RU E)
location(P, L) ← owner(P, D) ∧ location(D, L)

roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)
acl(role(P, R, police dept)) = {p1 , p2 }

p3

acl(location(P, L)) = {p1 , p2 }

p4

trust(location(D, L)) = {p6 }

?owner(bob, pda15)

?location(pda15, L)

(p5 , p4 , ?owner(bob, pda15), T RU E)

(p6 , p4 , ?location(pda15, airport), T RU E)

owner(bob, pda15)
acl(owner(P, D)) = {p4 }

p5

location(D, L) ← in(A, L) ∧ wif i(D, A)

p6

in(ap39, airport)
acl(location(D, L)) = {p4 }

?wif i(pda15, X)

trust(wif i(D, L)) = {p7 }

(p7 , p6 , ?wif i(pda15, ap39), T RU E)
wif i(pda15, ap39)

p7

acl(wif i(D, airport)) = {p6 }

Figure 17. Example of an emergency response system. Principal p0 is a first responder whose
role is “operation chief”. Principal p1 represents a surveillance camera image server. Principal
p2 is the role membership server of an incident management system (IMS). Principal p3 is the
role membership server of a police department. Principal p4 represents a location-tracking
service. The arrows represent the flow of queries among the principals. Each arrow is labeled
with a query and a returned proof tree. The query is shown above the dashed line; the proof
is shown below the line. Each principal’s rules, facts and policies are shown in a dashed
rectangle.
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q0
p0

q1

qk−2

p1

qk−1
pk

pk−1

Case 1: Only principal p0 belongs to the set receivers(pk ).

PSfrag replacements

q0
p0

q1
p1

ql−1

ql
pl

qk−2

qk−1
pk−1

pk

Case 2: Some intermediate principal pl belongs to the set receivers(pk ) as well.

Figure 18. Linear proof trees with and without an intermediate principal that belongs to the
set receivers. Black circles denote principals that belong to receivers, and white circles denote
principals that does not belong to receivers. Each circle is labeled with a principal name, and
each arrow is labeled with a query name.

Base case: We first show that our claim holds in the case of a single-node proof tree. Suppose that principal p0
makes query q to principal p1 , and p1 , which does not issue any subqueries, returns a proof whose proof tree only
contains a root node. We only need to show that p1 ’s confidentiality policies are satisfied, because p0 does not disclose
any information in its knowledge base to p1 . To satisfy p1 ’s confidentiality policies, p1 must have a confidentiality
policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches query q and p1 belongs to the set t. The function GENERATE P ROOF in
Figure 15 ensures this condition in line 3. Therefore, principals p0 and p1 construct a proof only if their confidentiality
policies are satisfied.
Induction step: We next show that, if our claim holds for a proof tree whose depth is less than k, then it also holds
for a proof tree of depth k. (The base case above considers a tree of depth 0.) Without loss of generality, we consider
the case that a proof tree is linear. Because our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies on each node depends
only on the nodes on the path from that node to the root in a proof tree; the node is not aware of the existence of the
nodes in other branches of the proof tree.
Suppose that there is a linear tree of depth k where nodes n0 , . . . , nk are ordered from the root to the leaf. Let
p0 , . . . , pk be the principals that represent nodes n0 , . . . , nk respectively, and q0 , . . . , qk−1 be the queries, where qi
is the query by pi to pi+1 . When principal p0 issues query q0 to p1 , we consider two cases in Figure 18. In case 1,
only principal p0 belongs to a set of principals receivers(pk ) defined in Section 5.4. In case 2, there are some other
principals in the set receivers(pk ) besides principal p0 .
We first consider case 1. Because principal p1 does not belong to receivers(pk ), principal p2 cannot distinguish
query q1 issued by principal p1 from q1 issued by principal p0 instead, because all the parameters in those queries
are same in both cases; the set receivers contains only principal p0 in both cases. The same can be observed for
p2 , . . . , pk . In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that a proof tree for query q1 is
constructed by principals p2 , . . . , pk if their confidentiality policies are satisfied. Because principals p2 , . . . , pk do not
distinguish the former case from the latter, our algorithm ensures that their confidentiality policies are preserved in
the former case as well. The function GENERATE P ROOF in Figure 15 ensures principal p1 ’s confidentiality policies
in lines 3. Principal p0 ’s confidentiality policies are vacuously satisfied because p0 does not disclose any information.
We, therefore, prove that our algorithm ensures the confidentiality policies of the principals p0 , . . . , pk with a proof
tree of depth k in case 1.
We next consider case 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a single principal pl in receivers(pk )
between principal p0 and pk . There are two subcases to be considered. In the first, subcase 2a, principal pl can decrypt
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all the nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk in the proof tree for query ql ; that is, principals pl+1 , . . . , pk choose pl as the receiver of
their returning proofs. Because principals pl+1 , . . . , pk do not choose p0 from receivers(pj ) = {p0 , pl } for j = l + 1
to k as the receiver principal of their proofs respectively, their algorithm works in the same way as the case where
the set receivers(pj ) = {pl } for j = l to k. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures the
confidentiality policies of pl+1 , . . . , pk . Because principal pl returns a proof with a single-node proof tree, principals
p0 , . . . , pl−1 are not aware of the fact that principal pl issues query ql for handling query ql−1 . Therefore, by the
induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures the confidentiality policies of p0 , . . . , pl−1 . Principal pl ’s confidentiality
policies are also satisfied because our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies on pl works in the same way
as the case that pl does not issue any subqueries and constructs a single-node proof tree responding to query ql−1 ,
because there is no constraint on pl due to recursive encryption because pl can decrypt all the nodes in the proof from
pl+1 to pk . Therefore, our claim holds for subcase 2a.
The second subcase 2b is that principal pl cannot decrypt some nodes in the proof tree received from pl+1 . If
principal pl cannot decrypt node nm between nl and nk (i.e., l < m < k), the proof tree does not satisfy pl ’s
integrity policies, and the proof fails. We, therefore, only consider the case that pl cannot decrypt leaf node nk only.
When node nk chooses p0 as a receiver principal, our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies works for nodes
n1 , . . . , nk−1 in the same way as the case that node nk is omitted (i.e., principal pk−1 does not issue query qk−1 to
pk ) because pk ’s proof encrypted with principal p0 ’s public key does not interfere with the processes of principals
p1 , . . . , pk−1 for choosing a receiver principal of their proofs from the set receivers = {p0 , pl } or {p0 }. The depth
of the tree with nodes n1 , . . . , nk−1 is k − 1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that
a proof tree is constructed only when the confidentiality policies of principals p1 , . . . , pk−1 are satisfied. Principal
p0 ’s confidentiality policies are satisfied vacuously, and pk ’s confidentiality policies of principal pk are also satisfied
because our algorithm on pk works in the same way as the case that pk constructs a proof tree of a single depth
responding to query qk−1 issued by principal p0 . Therefore, our algorithm ensures that a proof tree is constructed
only when the confidentiality policies of every principal is satisfied. We cover all the cases in terms of confidentiality
policies and conclude the proof.

6.2

Proof for integrity policies

We prove that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the integrity policies of every participating principal are
satisfied by induction below.
Base case: We first show that our claim holds in the case of a single-node proof tree. Suppose that principal p0
makes query q0 to principal p1 , and p1 , which does not issue any subqueries, returns a single-node proof tree. We only
need to show that p0 ’s integrity policies are satisfied, because p0 does not disclose any information in its knowledge
base. To satisfy p0 ’s integrity policies, p0 must have an integrity policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches query
q and p1 belongs to set t. Line 31 in p0 ’s function GENERATE P ROOF in Figure 15 obtains a proof from p1 by calling
the function ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY, and line 32 in the function calls the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY whose
line 3 ensures that the proof satisfies the above condition. Therefore, principals p0 and p1 construct a proof if their
integrity polices are satisfied.
Induction step: We next show that if our claim holds for a proof tree whose depth is less than k, then it also holds for
a proof tree of depth k. We consider the case that a proof tree is linear as we do in Section 6.1, because we can check
the integrity of a proof tree by checking whether every path from the root to each leaf node satisfies given integrity
policies. This claim is proved by induction as follows. The base case holds because there is only a single node in a
proof tree. Suppose that our claim holds for a proof tree of depth k − 1. By induction hypothesis, each subtree of
depth k − 1 satisfies given integrity policies if every path from the root node to each leaf node satisfies the integrity
policies. If every path from the root node to each leaf node in the proof tree of depth k satisfies integrity policies, the
root node must satisfy the policies as well. According to our definition of the integrity of a proof tree in Section 5.1, a
proof tree of depth k satisfies given integrity policies if the root node and all the subtrees of depth k − 1 under the root
node satisfy the integrity policies. Therefore, our claim holds for the proof tree of depth k, and we conclude the proof
of the above claim.
We assume the same linear proof tree in Section 6.1; that is, there is a linear tree of length k where nodes n0 , . . . , nk
are ordered from the root to the leaf. Let p0 , . . . , pk be the principals that represent nodes n0 , . . . , nk respectively, and
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q0 , . . . , qk−1 be the queries as before. When principal p0 issues query q0 to p1 , we consider the same two cases in
Figure 18.
We first consider case 1. Because principal p1 does not belong to the set receivers(pk ), principal p2 cannot
distinguish query q1 issued by principal p1 from q1 issued by principal p0 instead, because all the parameters in those
queries are same in both cases. In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that a proof tree for
query q1 is constructed by principals p2 , . . . , pk if their integrity policies are satisfied. Because principals p2 , . . . , pk
do not distinguish the former case from the latter, our algorithm ensures their integrity policies in the former case
as well. Principal p1 checks the integrity of the proof from principal p2 in the same way regardless of whether p1 ’s
issuing query q1 is for handling query q0 or not. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, p1 ’s integrity policies are
satisfied. Principal p0 checks the integrity of the proof from principal p1 with the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY
as follows. The integrity of the rule in node n1 is ensured in line 6, and, by the induction hypothesis, the integrity of
the subtree of depth k − 1 from principal p2 is ensured in line 8 by checking the integrity of the proof tree whose root
node is n2 by calling the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY recursively. Therefore, the function ensures that p0 ’s
integrity policies are satisfied with the proof tree from node n1 . We, therefore, prove that our algorithm ensures the
integrity policies of the principals p0 , . . . , pk with a proof tree of depth k in case 1.
We next consider case 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a principal pl in receivers(pk ) between
principal p0 and pk . There are two subcases to be considered. In the first, subcase 2a, the subproof from principal
pl is a single-node proof tree that contains a query’s result; principals pl+1 , . . . , pk choose pl as the receiver of their
nodes. Because principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 are not aware of the fact that principal pl issues query ql , by the induction
hypothesis, the integrity policies of principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 are satisfied. The fact that principal p0 belongs to the list
receivers(pl ) of query ql does not change the behaviors of principals pl+1 , . . . , pk for handling query ql . Because
our algorithm works for principals pl , . . . , pk in the same way that principal issues query ql independently, by the
induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that principal pl ’s integrity policies are satisfied for subcase 2a.
The second case 2b is that a proof from principal pl contains node nk whose proof tree is encrypted with p0 ’s
public key, as it could be done in line 19 of the function GENERATE P ROOF in Figure 15. The proof from pl does not
contain any other encrypted nodes because pl needs to read the nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 to check the integrity of the
proof from pl+1 . Principal pl checks whether the rules in nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 satisfies pl ’s integrity policies, which
is done in line 6 of the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY in Figure 16. If principal pl cannot decrypt all the nodes
nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 , pl returns a proof that contains FALSE because its failure to check the integrity of the proof, and,
therefore, the proof tree for query q0 is not constructed. Because principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 cannot distinguish whether
the encrypted boolean value in the proof from pl is generated by principal pl or its descendant principal pk , by the
induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that the integrity polices of principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 are satisfied if p0
accepts a proof tree whose leaf node nl contains an encrypted boolean value in node nk .
We next consider the integrity policies of principals pl , . . . , pk . In order for principal pl to check the integrity of the
proof from principal pl+1 , pl must read all the intermediate nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 in that proof. Therefore, principals
pl+1 , . . . , pk−1 must choose pl as the receiver principal of their returning proofs. Principal pl+1 , . . . , pk−1 work in
the same way as the case that principal pl issues query ql without receiving ql−1 so, by the induction hypothesis, their
integrity policies are preserved. Principal pk ’s integrity policies are satisfied vacuously. Principal pl ’s algorithm for
enforcing integrity policies does not read the encrypted value in node nk and works in the same way regardless of
returning a proof to pk−1 or not. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, pl ’s integrity policies are also preserved. We
cover all the cases and conclude the proof.

7

Related work

Although others have developed context-sensitive authorization systems, they all use a trusted central context server
that collects context information, and they do not address the protection of context information used in authorization
rules or facts. Cerberus [3] allows principals to define context-sensitive policies based on first-order logic. It expresses
context information with context predicates such as “Location” and “Temperature”, similar to our approach. Cerberus
has a monolithic context infrastructure that contains current and historical context information, and a single inference
engine evaluates all the authorization decisions. Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [8, 9] introduces the environmental
role (ERole) to achieve context-aware authorization. Their approach is based on the concept of Role-based accesscontrol (RBAC). Constraints on environmental (context) variables can be defined with a Prolog-like logic language.
Authorization is based on an ordinary role and an ERole; in effect, the ERole is an additional condition to be satisfied
for an authorization decision. GRBAC has a central context management service that maintains a snapshot of current
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environmental conditions. OASIS [4, 12] is an RBAC system that can evaluate contextual conditions at both roleactivation time and access time. The context conditions are expressed as context predicates in the Horn clauses of
role-activation rules. OASIS has a centralized object-relational database that stores context predicates. Myles [18]
provides a XML-based authorization language for defining privacy policies that protect users’ location information.
Users must trust a set of validators that collect context information and make authorization decisions.
SD3 [15] is an inference engine for a trust management system that constructs a proof tree for a given query so
that the querier can verify the correctness of the query result. Its focus is to retrieve certificates (that correspond to
facts in a knowledge base) from remote hosts automatically, and a whole proof tree is constructed on a central server.
Therefore, all the remote hosts must trust the central server to preserve the confidentiality policies of their facts.
The idea of delegating the evaluation of a proof to a trusted server also appears in some protocols used to verify a
certificate in a public-key infrastructure. To verify a certificate, one must construct a certificate chain from the certificate authority (CA) that issued the certificate to a CA that is trusted by a querier. The Simple Certificate Validation
Protocol (SCVP) [17] allows a client with limited processing and communication capabilities to ask a trusted server
about the validity of a certificate. The client can specify a list of trusted CAs in its validation policy to be observed by
the server. The client can ask the server to provide additional information, such as a certification path and corresponding revocation status, depending on the trustworthiness of the server. Although it is similar to our work in the sense
that the protocol uses the client’s trust in the server to split the overhead of verifying a certificate between them, it is
specialized in handling certificate chains, and it does not support general rules. In addition, there is no mechanism that
addresses the confidentiality of rules or facts, because cross certificates (trust relations) among CAs are considered to
be public knowledge.

8

Discussion
In this section, we discuss several design issues and security properties of our system.

8.1

Completeness of our algorithm

The algorithm of the function GENERATE P ROOF in Figure 10 and Figure 15 is not complete. That is, it does
not guarantee to find a proof that derives a granting decision, because when the function finds a proof that contains
encrypted subproofs from other principals, it stops searching other proofs. If the returned proof turns out to be invalid
because some encrypted subproofs derives false, or because the evaluation is impossible due to tight integrity or
confidentiality policies, our algorithm fails to find a possibly existing proof with some other combination of rules and
facts. To address this problem, we need to modify our algorithm so that it continues to search for another proof from
the point of the search space where a previous proof is found.

8.2

Security assurance

Our authorization scheme ensures that each principal’s confidentiality policies are preserved while participating
in the evaluation of an authorization query. A malicious principal that represents an internal node of a proof subtree
cannot obtain a rule or a fact from other principals by modifying the receivers list in a subquery it issues, because each
principal discloses its rules or facts to other principals only if they satisfy its confidentiality policies as described in
Section 6.1.
The malicious principal could also modify the integrity policies i policies in a subquery to disturb the evaluation of
a query. This attack can be prevented if every principal publishes its integrity policies with its digital signature on a
well-known server, and each principal can cache other principal’s integrity policies. The i policies in a query can then
be retrieved by identifying the principal specified by the last index of the receivers list.
We use a nonce to prevent a reply attack by a malicious principal that is capable of intercepting and modifying a
message. All the participating principals that evaluate an authorization query use the same nonce because the receiver
of a proof might be different from a querier principal. The nonce in a proof must match the nonce in the query, for the
proof to be valid.
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8.3

Complexity of policy definition

Although it seems difficult for each principal to define confidentiality and integrity policies for rules and facts, it is
possible for a principal to refer to the policies of other principals to reduce the administrative work for defining policies.
For example, principal p0 could define a meta-rule that says “if principal p1 trusts the integrity of the evaluation of a
query q by principal p2 , then p0 trusts the integrity of q in the same way.” This meta-rule would allow most users to
defer on many policies to a trusted administrator, for example.
When principals consider trust relations in terms of the confidentiality and integrity policies transitive, it is possible
for each principal to expand its confidentiality and integrity policies automatically while collaborating with other
principals to construct proof trees. Here we assume that the integrity and confidentiality policies of each principal are
public knowledge as stated in Section 3.4.
We first describe how each principal expands its integrity policies by issuing a query to another principal. Suppose
that principal p0 issues a query q0 (?grant(p)) to principal p1 and p1 issues a subsequent query q1 (?a(x)) to p2 . If
principal p0 trusts p1 ’s integrity for evaluating query q0 (i.e., p1 ∈ trust0 (grant(p)), p0 also trusts p2 ’s integrity for
evaluating query q1 implicitly. Therefore, p0 should update its integrity policy for query q1 such that trust0 (a(x)) =
trust0 (a(x)) ∪ trust1 (a(x)). Principal p0 could obtain p1 ’s integrity policy trust1 (a(x)) with query q0 ’s result from
p1 . The handler principal p1 actually returns the integrity policy on the rule pattern that is matched with the query q0 ;
that is, if principal p1 handling query grant(bob) unifies query q0 with rule grant(P ) ← a(P ) and issues a remote
query ?a(bob), p1 returns trust1 (a(P )) so that a querier can update its policies on rule pattern a(P ) rather than on
its instance a(bob). If a handler principal obtains integrity policies from its downstream principals in the same way, it
forwards those integrity policies to its querier so that they are shared among the principals involved in constructing a
proof tree.
We can apply the same idea to update confidentiality policies of each principal. For example, suppose that principal
p1 issues a query q1 (?a(x)) to principal p2 . Principal p2 returns a query result if p1 satisfies p2 ’s confidentiality
policies (i.e., p1 ∈ acl2 (a(x))). If p1 allows another principal p0 to disclose q1 ’s result based on its policy (p0 ∈
acl1 (a(x))), then p2 should also allow p0 to disclose it; principal p2 updates its confidentiality policies such that
acl2 (a(x)) = acl2 (a(x)) ∪ acl1 (a(x)).

8.4

Scalability

When many principals are involved in constructing a proof tree that contains a lot of rules and facts, the communication overhead (including work for security operations such as the verification of digital signatures) could cause long
latency. Although we leave the experiments to evaluate the scalability of our system as our future work, we discuss
several possible solutions to address this issue. First, each querier could set a timeout period to cancel a query request,
and the querier interprets the occurrence of a timeout event as that the query result is false.
Second, although our algorithm described in Section 5.5 chooses a querier in a depth-first manner, we could modify
our algorithm so that a querier principal can choose the handler principal that is most likely to reply with the minimum
latency from a list of principals capable of handling the query. Because we believe that most authorization granting
services and other query services are long-running, it may be possible for each principal to choose a good handler
principal based on the logs of the latency of the past queries. It may also be helpful to issues the same query to
multiple principals in parallel.
Third, there are some situations where we can reduce the number of principals involved in constructing a proof tree
by replicating rules, facts, and security policies aggressively while preserving each principal’s security policies. We
give a small example in Figure 19 that shows how the distributed processing is simplified. In Figure 19, principal p0
issues query ?grant(bob) to p1 , which issues subsequent query role(bob, doctor) to p2 . The three principals p0 , p1 ,
and p2 are involved in the original query processing in Figure 19a. Because principal p0 trusts the integrity of p1 ’s
query result for ?grant(bob), it can also trust the integrity of rule grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor), which is unified
with the query. In addition, when principal p0 considers trust relations in integrity policies transitive, p0 trusts the
integrity of fact role(bob, doctor) maintained by principal p2 . Therefore, p0 replicates p1 ’s rule and integrity policy
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 } into its repository, and, as a result, the query processing is simplified as in Figure 19b
if principal p2 allows p0 to read the query result of ?role(P, Q).
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trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 }

?grant(bob)
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p1

grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor)
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 }
acl(grant(P )) = {p0 }
acl(grant(P ) ← role(P, Q)) = {p0 }

?role(bob, doctor)

?role(bob, doctor)

p2

p2

role(bob, doctor)
acl(role(P, Q)) = {p0 , p1 }

role(bob, doctor)
acl(role(P, Q)) = {p0 , p1 }

(a) Original distributed processing

(b) Simplified distributed processing

Figure 19. Simplified distributed processing of a proof tree. Principal p0 replicates rule
grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor) from p1 and integrity policy trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 } from principal p1 into its repository, and can in the future make queries directly to p2 .

8.5

Expressiveness of the authorization language

Our example in Section 2.1 represents policies about the current context. Although we do not treat temporal
information specially in our language, our language can express some policies about historical context by defining
predicates that take a timestamp as an argument. The following is an example policy in a workflow system where an
authorization decision is based on whether a requester has performed a series of actions in a specified sequence.
grant(P, purchase, X) ← approved(mgr, P, X, t1 ), approved(senior mgr, P, X, t2 ), prior(t1 , t2 )
The above policy requires that a requester needs to obtain an approval from the manager first, and then from the senior
manager. The predicate prior is used to check whether timestamp t1 is prior to t2 .
Our language does not express separation of duty [2] in role-based access control (RBAC) model [19], because to
express separation of duty with a logic language (as Jajodia [14] proposes) requires support for rules that contain the
negations of atoms. A querier possibly obtains a false negative in our system due to the constraints of the security
policies of each principal. Therefore, a query that is a negation of an atom causes false positive, which is not acceptable
to any authorization system.

8.6

User feedback

It would be useful, in the case of a FALSE proof, to provide some feedback for the user about why the proof
failed and what policies prevent them from obtaining the desired access. Although to return an incomplete proof is a
plausible solution, there are two issues to be addressed. First, the user might not have sufficient privileges to receive
the incomplete proof, and, as a result, the user is not able to know that the subproof failed. Second, because there
could be multiple incomplete proofs for a given query, we need some mechanism that chooses a useful proof for the
user from them. The KNOW system [16], which is a centralized rule-based authorization system, proposes to use a
cost function to rank proofs for a query based on the likeliness that the user is able to satisfy the conditions in the
proofs. It is, however, difficult to define a reasonable cost function in a decentralized system like ours because there is
no single administrator who knows all the rules and security policies that are involved in authorization decisions. We
leave this complex problem for future work.
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Summary and future work

We describe a secure context-sensitive authorization system that supports the decentralized construction and evaluation of authorization decisions, involving multiple principals from different administrative domains, and respects the
confidentiality and integrity policies of each principal involved.
We define our security model based on the notion of rule patterns that allow each principal to define confidentiality
and integrity policies on the rules and facts in its knowledge base. Because our system evaluates an authorization
query on multiple evaluation nodes in a distributed way, it is possible for each principal to choose to which principal it
is willing to disclose the information needed to evaluate the authorization query. We describe our key algorithms and
prove that our algorithms guarantee that the proof for an authorization query is constructed only if the security policies
of each participating principals are satisfied.
Our current prototype system is implemented in Java, by extending XProlog [20] with a feature to construct a proof
for a query instead of simply evaluating the query and returning a result. We plan to deploy our current implementation
in realistic large-scale applications and to evaluate the performance and scalability of our system. We also plan to
explore various optimization techniques such as caching and parallel search for a proof to improve the performance
and the scalability of the system. Another possible extension of our system is to add some mechanism for giving user
feedback as we discuss in Section 8.6.
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